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THE APPLICABILITY OF TORGERSON'S CONCEPT OF FIAT MEASUREMENT
IN DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Christine V. Zavgren and S.

J.

Lambert

Department of Accounting
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588

The concept of "fiat measurement" is an alternative to fundamental and derived measurement. This concept is believed to be more
descriptive of measurement in the social sciences, where in most cases
theories as well-formed as those in the physical sciences do not exist.
In fiat measurement an index or measurement of a concept is assumed
to be representative of that concept. However, the representation between a measurement scale and the theoretical concept cannot be
proven. Although fiat measurement is descriptive of much current work
in social sciences, it is shown to be a problematic concept because of
its arbitrariness, lack of foundation in theory, and non-confirmability.
The nature of theories and the relations of measurement to scientific
theories are discussed. The use of fiat measurement is related to a prescientific state of some of the social sciences. Before better forms of
measurement can be used, considerable theoretical development is
necessary in these sciences.

value, numerosity, and mass are fundamentally measurable.
Derived measurement depends on the prior measurement of
fundamental magnitudes and is descriptive of measures such
as density and acceleration.

MEASUREMENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS

Campbell's classification system of measurement fits well
in the more mature sciences. Whereas physical sciences such as
physics and chemistry are well developed and have explicit
structures, many of the social sciences do not. When Campbell's structure is extended in an attempt to describe social
science measurement, problems arise with the disciplines
which are in earlier stages of development, or which are "prescientific." In the social sciences there are few examples of
fundamental or derived measurement. One objective of this
paper is to discuss this paucity and to link it to the status of
the development of social science theories.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of
fiat measurement and to characterize its place in scientific
theories of developmental-stage disciplines. Two major measurement-classification systems will be briefly surveyed to
determine where fiat measurement fits. This is followed by
consideration of the general structure of theories in order to
characterize fiat measurement more formally. Finally, several
examples are given.

A second major measurement-classification system was
developed by Stevens (1959: 18-36), a social scientist. Stevens'
system is based on the types of measurement scales which are
used. He identified five scale types: nominal, ordinal, interval,
ratio, and logarithmic interval scales. The basis of his system
is the type of transformation that leaves the scale form invariant. It is Stevens' system which is usually used when social
science measurement is discussed.

Two primary classification systems have been developed
to describe measurement. First, Campbell (1928) recognized
two kinds of measurement: fundamental and derived. His
system is descriptive of kinds of measurement used in the
physical sciences, but it has often been extended to the social
sciences. Campbell's system is based on whether or not a particular measure depends on any prior measurement.

While Stevens' system is descriptive of the classification of scalings used in the social sciences, it does not shed
light on issues such as the meaning of measurement scales
in relation to abstract theoretical concepts. Although Stevens'
system will classify measurement scales according to their
mathematical properties, it does not deal with the question
of whether or not they are artificial constructs. That is, it
will define an intelligence scale as being an interval scale,
but not whether an intelligence test actually measures intelligence. Thus, a second objective is to analyze the theoretical
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Fundamental measurement depends on no prior measurement. Practically, only a few properties, such as length, time,
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importance of measurement scales and the properties which
they measure.
Suggestions have been made by several authors for expanding these measurement-classification systems, notably
Coombs (1952), Ellis (1966), and Torgerson (1958). Their aim
has been to establish the characteristics which are necessary
to classify a scaling technique or numerical-assignment technique as measurement. With this in mind, Torgerson (1958:
21-24) added to Campbell's system a third kind of measurement, which he called fiat measurement. In fiat measurement,
the associative relation between the property to be measured
and one or more observable properties which serve as indices
of it is somewhat arbitrarily defined. The measurement of the
observable property is considered an index of the underlying
non-observable property. This is similar to Ellis' (1966:56)
concept of associative measurement, which he considered only
to be possible' if "there is an independently measurable quantity, q, associated with the quantity, p, to be measured, such
that if things (under certain specified conditions) are arranged
in the order of q, they are also arranged in the order of p."
The arbitrary nature of the measurement emerges because, if
the underlying concept is non-measurable, then the establishment of the correspondence between the ordering of the two
properties is not factually demonstrable. This type of measurement is represented by measures of intelligence, hunger, and
social status. Although far from ideal, these types of measurements continue to find use in the social sciences because the
underlying non-measurable properties have utility, and because
none of the more preferable measures is yet possible.
GENERAL STRUCTURE
OF THEORIES AND MEASUREMENT
An understanding of the essential place of measurement
for the confirmation and predictive ability of theories holds
promise of adding insight to problems of measurement in the
social sciences. To this end, it is necessary to discuss the structure of scientific theories, and then to ascertain the nature of
measurement in relation to theories.
A scientist examines a particular aspect of the world, or
domain, with generally three objectives: to discover general
regularities which explain the phenomena which he observes
(general laws), to make predictions, and to control or influence the relevant domain in the environment. The objectives
must proceed in order. To discover general regularities, the
scientist abstracts the most important elements of the domain,
or selected portion of the environment. These basic elements
are the theoretical terms, which through induction are stated
in axioms of the system. The axioms state the important relations between these elements. In the axiomatic-deductive
method, these basic elements and relationships form a mathematical or formal model, which is intended to be descriptive

of the domain. Mathematical or logical calculi are then applied'
to this basic model to deduce as complete a description of the
structure of the domain as is necessary and practicable.
This basic model is used, through deductive reasoning, to
derive testable hypotheses, predictions, and normative statements (especially in the case of the social sciences). A wellformed theory must be logically consistent, its logical structure should not be redundant, and it should be complete in
the sense that it must be possible to derive a statement describing all essential characteristics of the subject matter. A
theory is not complete if it cannot provide sufficient predictions and explanations. As well as satisfying these three formal
criteria, a theory must be factual, or confirmable. Hypotheses
generated from the model should be testable, and these tests
must indicate that they are not contrary to fact. To these
traditional criteria of scientific theories, it is well to add a fifth
which is of importance especially in the social sciences: the
criterion of social usefulness. A social theory must be evaluated in terms of its usefulness in establishing policy or making
decisions.
Theories which contain testable hypotheses are said to
have empirical content. Empirical content is added to a theory
by interpreting the formal structure in order to ascertain if
the structure yields realistic propositions. Any formal structure which purports to describe the domain is a model, but a
model only becomes a theory when empirical confirmation is
added.
Figure 1 illustrates, in a simplified sense, the relationship
between axiomatic theory and the domain of the real world
to which the theory applies.
The mathematical conclusions are hypotheses which,
when interpreted, must not contradict observations in the
real world; these are actually predictions concerning objects
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FIGURE 1. Scientific investigation (adapted from Coombs,
Raiffa, and Thrall, 1954:133).
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and properties in the domain. A test of such a hypothesis
amounts to matching the mathematical conclusions against
physical events. If correspondence is found, the theory is said
to be confirmed. If none is found, the theory is not confirmed, and it is merely a formal structure without interpretation. Such a structure is useless in any discipline which needs
useful predictions and general rules to apply to empirical
situations.
Measurement theory relates to theory construction in
that measurement is the strongest form of correspondence.
Whereas in the tests of hypotheses with which we have been
concerned correspondence between the real world and the
structure of the theory was needed, in measurement the correspondence is an exact numerical one. Instead of the correspondence between theory and domain being qualitative, the
correspondence mirrors the ordering of events in the real
world in a very strictly determined way.
FIAT MEASUREMENT
Classification of a measurement as fiat measurement
rather than as some higher form of measurement seems attributable to two potential problems within a theory which is not
well-developed:
1. The nature of the relationships among the theory's
theoretical terms may not be well-established, or
2. The nature of the relationship between the theory's
theoretical and observational terms may not be wellestablished.
Several possible combinations of these relationships are
shown in Figure 2. The solid arrow indicates a relationship
that is well-established, and the wavy arrow indicates a fuzzy
onc. Terms which have been used to describe these are constitutive significance and epistemic significance (Dumont and
Wilson, 1970).

Constitutive significance refers to the nature of the relationships among the theoretical terms or Theoretical Vocabulary, VT, of a theory and relates primarily to its explanatory
power. This relationship can be relatively strong or weak.
When strong, the theory's explanatory power is strong, with
some of the assumptions of the theory having achieved the
status of scientific laws. When relatively weak, the explanatory
power of the theory is weak.
Epistemic significance refers to the nature of the relationship between observable terms or Observational Vocabulary,
VO, and theoretical terms, VT, of a theory and relates primarily to its predictive power. This relationship can be wellestablished (when representation is proved) or fuzzy, when it
is arbitrarily assigned.
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As Figure 2 shows, a theory in a mature science has both
epistemic and constitutive significance. The logical relations
between the theoretical terms are well-established, and the
correspondence rules between theoretical and observational
terms are empirically justified. The mapping representation in
the measurement function has been empirically verified . In those
theories classified as less well-developed, either constitutive or
epistemic significance is absent, or in some cases both are not
well-established. In a pre-scientific discipline, the epistemic significance may be vaguely conceived. That is, the relations
between theoretical terms or between theoretical and observational terms may be approximately known, but not exactly
well-defined. If constitutive significance is absent, the contribution of theoretical terms to explanation and prediction is not
empirically verified. Progression from a pre-scientific discipline
to a mature science involves improving the status of terms and
relations through logical analysis and empirical verification.
Several hypothetical examples of social science measurement are also shown in Figure 2. The measurement of depreciation is a case in which a given income concept (such as
economic income) leads to a well-defined depreciation concept
(such as economic depreciation). However, economic depreciation is not in many cases an operational concept. Thus,
although the relation between the theoretical terms and the
properties to be measured is well-defined, the mapping representation cannot be established exactly.
In measuring intelligence, problem-solving ability and
vocabulary, as well as other properties, might be assumed to
be related to intelligence, but this cannot be proven. However,
the mapping function between problem-solving ability and the
intelligence test is verified. In this case the relationship between the theoretical term and the property to be measured
is not well-established, whereas the mapping representation is
well-established.
In the pre-scientific measurement of social status shown in
Figure 2, it can be seen that both types of relationships are
weak. Social status is assumed to be somewhat related to upward mobility, which in turn, is assumed to be related to
salary. However, these relationships cannot be substantiated
beyond statistical tests of significance.
CONCLUSIONS
Social science theories which employ fiat measurement
are useful since they provide a more formal way of looking at
phenomena: they provide at least a starting point for developing a science. Fiat measurements certainly are not as desirable
as fundamental and derived ones because of the lack of veri fication of relationships between indices and theoretical concepts.
Fiat measurement leads to the danger of scientific relativism,
because factual truth cannot be verified.
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FIGURE 2. Measurement and the development of sciences. (V T = Theoretical Vocabulary; V0 = Observational Vocabulary.)
Fiat measurement is, however, descriptive of measurement
as it is performed in many of the social sciences. Fiat measurements do provide refinement of knowledge which can lead to a
clarification of epistemic and constitutive significance. When
this clarification proceeds to the point that the science has
both epistemic and constitutive significance, the discipline has
evolved into a mature science. Then measurement in the classical sense is possible.
John Dewey (I938:345) quoted Charles Peirce's expression of a similar idea: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract
statement with the ideal limit towards which endless inquiry
would tend to bring scientific belief."
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